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Abstract 
 
This article analyzes Portugal’s path to European integration by describing the 
economic policy of the country from 1947 onward; it argues that this policy of state 
intervention and commercial openness followed the same patterns as those found 
in other Western European countries even before the revolution of 1974 and 
accession to the EEC. A backward and dictatorial country emulated the economic 
policy of democratic and developed countries so that, when it joined the EEC, 
most trade barriers had already been dismantled. Portugal’s experience sheds light 
on European integration outside the core group of industrialized European 
countries and beyond the EEC/EU experience. 
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Resumo 
 
Este artigo analisa o caminho português de integração europeia, desde 1947, 
defendendo-se que o país seguiu uma via de intervenção política de económica 
interna, associada à abertura ao exterior, semelhante ao que foi feito nos restantes 
países da Europa Ocidental, mesmo antes da Revolução de 1974. Essa semelhança 
de processos levou a que adesão à CEE, em 1986, acabasse por ser feita sem 
dificuldades de maior. A experiência portuguesa lança luz sobre a história da 
integração europeia, para além da história do núcleo central dos países mais 
industrializados, fundadores das Comunidades Europeias. 
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Introduction 
 
Portugal’s membership of European institutions dates back to the period of the 
Estado Novo, when the country was ruled by a dictatorial regime, and its integration 
continued steadily through the following decades, peaking with its joining the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1986. The first steps leading to that integration began 
with its joining the Marshall Plan in 1948, thereby becoming a founding member of the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). In 1950, Portugal joined the 
European Payments Union (EPU), and in 1959, the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA). In 1962, it joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and 
finally, in 1972, Portugal signed a free trade agreement with the EEC. The analysis of such 
longstanding commitment to European integration sheds light on Portuguese political 
history, as well as illustrating the many ways that European integration proceeded, 
particularly in the western periphery of the continent. In fact, the analysis of the 
commitment of a peripheral and backward country, ruled by a dictatorial regime, sheds 
light on the history of European integration outside the group of industrialized and more 
developed countries. This article also analyzes the economic policy followed by Portuguese 
governments from the end of World War II onward, paying particular attention to the way 
in which policies that promoted domestic institutional development and stimulated the 
economy were related to measures that increased the degree of market openness. At the 
same time, this analysis considers the major developments that were taking place in the 
context of European integration.  
We have two main objectives. Firstly, this article will assess Portugal’s economic 
policy in the framework of the history of European integration. The main contention is 
that Portuguese economic policy followed patterns that were quite similar to those that we 
can find elsewhere in continental Europe, even before the democratic revolution of 1974–
1976 and Portugal’s accession to the EEC in 1986. Throughout the period analyzed here, 
the driving force of economic policy in Portugal was a combination of state intervention 
with measures designed to increase the exposure of the domestic economy to international 
market forces, above all, on a regional basis. Thus Portugal was pursuing the same 
economic policy as the more industrialized and democratic Western European countries.  
Secondly, this article shows that, when Portugal finally joined the EEC in 1986, 
most trade barriers with the rest of Western Europe had already been dismantled, with the 
exception of those relating to agricultural goods and fisheries and, more importantly, trade 
with Spain. This helps to explain the relative ease of the integration of the Portuguese 
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economy into the EEC economy after 1986 and helps to clarify the true relevance of the 
membership which, seen in this light, appears relatively less important. Portugal’s 
experience shows that European integration was not fostered by only EEC/EU 
membership, but that it could also be favored by other European institutions, such as the 
OEEC, EPU, and EFTA, and by international institutions, such as GATT. This article thus 
assesses the impact of Portugal’s quest to join Europe on the history of European 
integration, by showing the relevance of the history of European integration beyond the 
history of the EEC/EU.  
 
I. The OEEC years, 1947–1958 
 
The reconstruction of the European economy after World War II was grounded in 
the double aim of promoting economic growth with full employment—in order to achieve 
social and political stability—and giving a new role to Germany, which in the past had been 
a major engine for European growth. These two objectives were achieved through regional 
cooperation, which allowed for state intervention in the economy while maintaining an 
openness to market forces and international competition. The aim of the Marshall Plan and 
of the institutional framework of the OEEC and the EPU, established in 1948 and 1950 
respectively, was to provide a solution for Western European reconstruction by assisting 
the recovery of European trade and, at the same time, help to solve the German question 
by assisting its democratic and economic reconstruction in a peaceful context. The OEEC 
and the EPU sought to ensure cooperation between the member states with a view to 
removing quantitative restrictions, and to contribute to the reestablishment of multilateral 
payments. State intervention and trade liberalization were thus pursued within a European 
regional framework.3 
Initially, the Portuguese dictatorial government led by Salazar rejected the offer of 
Marshall aid and displayed an ambiguous position toward European cooperation, taking 
the official position that the country’s development did not require any external assistance.4 
However, the difficult economic situation in which the country found itself led the 
government to reverse its initial position. World War II had had a positive impact on 
Portugal’s balance of payments, as exports had increased and imports dwindled. Yet a large 
share of the gold and foreign exchange reserves thus accumulated had to be spent in 1947 
                                                 
3 Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–1951. 
4 Rollo, Portugal e o Plano Marshall. Da Rejeição à Solicitação da Ajuda Financeira Norte-Americana, 1947–1952. 
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on large imports of foodstuffs due to the bad agricultural production of that year. The 
pressing need for dollars caused the government to change its ideas regarding the Marshall 
Plan.5 The fact that Portugal had joined the OEEC at its commencement, and then the 
EPU, meant the abandonment of the autarkic policies of the prewar period, calling for 
participation in the new European economic order and the endorsement of the same 
economic policy as the one pursued by the other Western European countries.6 Crucially, 
this change in strategy was not announced publicly, as the government continued with its 
imperial rhetoric, presenting its situation as incompatible with European integration.7  
The Portuguese government was not unprepared for Portugal’s being opened up to 
international competition or for its economic integration with the other European 
countries: in fact this process was accompanied by government intervention, exactly as was 
happening in the other Western European countries.8 By the time Portugal joined the 
OEEC, its economic policy was essentially contained within the 1935 Law of Economic 
Reconstitution, scheduled to remain in force until 1950. This law was the Portuguese state’s 
first economic plan and the keystone for the many economic intervention tools created or 
reinforced by the state during its period of autarky in the 1930s. It detailed the new 
functions that the state sought to exercise and those it was permitted to exercise following 
the financial recovery for which Salazar was responsible during his first years in 
government. Moreover, the law sought to establish a framework for public and private 
investment by promoting the construction of infrastructures and the creation or 
strengthening of those industrial sectors that were considered to be of strategic importance 
for the national economy. In 1952 a new economic plan, the First Development Plan, was 
published, covering the years from 1953 to 1958. The plan consolidated the state’s 
determination to intervene in the construction of infrastructures and to promote 
manufacturing as well as the agricultural sector.9 
                                                 
5 Ferreira, “A estratégia para a adesão às instituições europeias”; Pinto and Teixeira, “Portugal e a integração 
europeia, 1945–1986.” 
6 For an analysis and comparison of the economic policy of Western European nations, Portugal included, 
see Crafts and Toniolo, Economic Growth in Europe since 1945. Portugal’s commitment to integration with the 
rest of Europe is also described by Eichengreen (The European economy since 1945: coordinated capitalism and 
beyond, 204–5). 
7 This rhetoric was very successful, as it survived the dictatorship and was absorbed by most historians, even 
those that were not connected to the regime. The acceptance of Marshall Aid has been comprehensively 
studied only by Rollo (Portugal e o Plano Marshall. Da Rejeição à Solicitação da Ajuda Financeira Norte-Americana, 
1947–1952), and the compatibility of the Empire with European integration has only been fully expressed by 
Leitão (“Portugal’s European integration policy, 1947–1972”; Estado Novo, Democracia e Europa, 1947–1986). 
8 Crafts and Toniolo, Economic Growth in Europe since 1945; Eichengreen, The European economy since 1945: 
coordinated capitalism and beyond . 
9 Lains, “O Estado e a industrialização em Portugal, 1945–1990”. 
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Participation in the OEEC, the Law of Economic Reconstitution, and the First 
Development Plan represented the framework for what would become the economic 
policy of the New State, continuing practically until its downfall. The first represented the 
beginning of Portugal’s association with the institutions of economic cooperation and 
international trade regulation, making its opening up to the outside world possible without 
endangering other policies aimed at favoring the country’s economic specialization. The 
Law and the Plan gave the state the necessary levers for influencing this economic and 
industrial specialization. This framing of economic policy was accompanied by other 
measures that proved to be of equal help and consisted of policies designed to control 
inflation and the prices of some essential products, as well as policies designed to ensure 
that the public accounts were balanced and to uphold the value of the currency.10 Thus, 
from the end of World War II onward, the economic policy pursued by Portugal in the 
1950s followed similar patterns to those of the other Western European countries: the 
opening up of the market and state intervention. 
 
II. The EFTA years, 1959–1974 
 
For the six governments that signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which established 
the EEC, the new Community was an instrument intended to guarantee what was seen as 
essential for their economic growth: maintaining the dynamism of the flow of exports to an 
area, the hub of which was the Federal Republic of Germany, by means of a regional 
trading area protected from international competition. In this regional and protected area, 
trade barriers would be eliminated, and exports, considered essential for economic growth, 
would increase.11 As rapid and deep integration required some similarities in terms of 
economic structures, peripheral nations were excluded from the EEC because of their 
limited potential for integration. In the case of Portugal, however, political questions were 
also important, given the difficulty of allowing a dictatorship to join institutions ruled by 
democratic principles. In any case, the exclusion of Portugal from the EEC did not mean 
that there was any interruption to this country’s pattern of integration with other Western 
European countries. 
Exports are essential for a small country, and Portugal had the chance to benefit 
from the reaction to the creation of the EEC on the part of the more industrialized OEEC 
                                                 
10 Lains, “Catching-up to the European core. Portuguese economic growth, 1910–1990.” 
11 Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State 
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countries, which in 1959 established the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) as a 
means of dismantling customs tariffs on industrial products. Portugal’s membership of this 
new international institution can be considered exceptional, as it was the only non-
industrialized country allowed to join. The governments and producers of the United 
Kingdom and the other EFTA members could have resisted the incorporation of a low-
wage country into their free trade area. However, because of the small size of the 
Portuguese economy, they were willing to make an exception. By becoming a member of 
EFTA, the Portuguese government was obliged to begin dismantling its customs barriers, 
although it did negotiate special clauses that allowed it to proceed at a more gradual pace, 
thereby giving its emerging industrial sectors some time to adapt. In addition to this, 
Portugal managed to guarantee the opening up of EFTA markets to exports of some of the 
country’s processed agricultural products—which it succeeded in having defined as 
industrial product—and thereby benefited from the lower duties of its EFTA partners. 
Taking on yet further obligations to liberalize, Portugal joined GATT in 1962.12 
This opening up of the Portuguese economy stimulated the development of the 
industrial structure and, as a result, Portuguese textiles and other light industrial products 
started to penetrate Western European markets. While the share of agricultural products 
decreased after 1960, the share of textiles, apparel, and footwear rose from 16 percent in 
1958 to 30 percent in 1973. A similar trend appeared in exports of chemicals and 
machinery. In this sense, EFTA membership led to a substantial increase in trade and, to a 
certain extent, in foreign investment, as well as a surge in export-oriented industries in 
sectors where Portugal had a comparative advantage. It should, however, be noted that, 
despite the important role that EFTA played in increasing Portuguese exports, the 
expansion of its exports to EEC countries became even more important since both the 
Federal Republic and France were, at that time, the motors of Western Europe’s economy 
due to their size and rapid growth.13 
Thanks to the opening up of trade achieved with membership of EFTA and 
GATT, the share of exports in GNP increased from 15 percent in the 1950s to 26 percent 
in 1973. Moreover, as Figure 1 shows, the degree of openness of the Portuguese economy 
increased substantially from 1960 to 1972. Measured at constant prices, it increased from 
20 percent to almost 40 percent, while at current prices it increased from 35 percent to 
almost 50 percent.  
                                                 
12 Lopes, A Economia Portuguesa desde 1960. 
13 Eichengreen, The European economy since 1945: coordinated capitalism and beyond, 205–7; Xavier, Portugal e a 
Integração Económica Europeia. 
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Figure 1: Trade openness ratio (imports and exports as a percentage of GDP; current prices) 
 
Source: Amador, Cabral, and Maria, “International trade patterns over the last four decades: how does 
Portugal compare with other cohesion countries?” 4. 
 
Figure 2 makes a comparison between the degree of openness of the Portuguese 
economy and those of the other EU Cohesion Fund beneficiaries: Ireland, Spain, and 
Greece. It also shows that, together with Ireland, Portugal was the country that most 
opened up its economy in the 1960s.  
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Figure 2: Trade openness ratio (imports and exports as a percentage of GDP; constant 2000 prices) 
 
Source: Amador, Cabral, and Maria, “International trade patterns over the last four decades: how does 
Portugal compare with other cohesion countries?” 4. 
 
The growth in industrial exports, remittances from emigrants, and capital imports 
allowed Portugal to maintain its external balance with low levels of inflation and a relatively 
stable exchange rate. Such a favorable external balance of payments enabled the 
government to continue with its policy of low interest rates and a balanced budget, thus 
encouraging the growth of both private and public investment. Opportunities for private 
investment in industry closely accompanied the structural transformations in internal 
demand resulting from improvements in living standards and the increase in external 
demand. The service sector grew in the same manner, primarily in banking and other 
financial services, commerce, health, and education. In the meantime, the Portuguese 
government used the finances made available as a result of the favorable macroeconomic 
situation to promote industrialization programs through direct intervention or the 
application of powerful protection mechanisms. The intervention of the Portuguese state 
in industry was mainly directed toward those sectors that were considered fundamental, 
such as energy production and transport. Without this intervention, the country’s electricity 
grid would not have expanded so rapidly, nor would it have been able to develop a cement 
industry, a national iron industry, fertilizers, or chemicals in general. These sectors were not 
new to the country, and their expansion depended—to a large extent—on accumulated 
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experiences, particularly during the interwar period. However, none of them would have 
grown at the rate that they did without state support. It must be stressed that this support 
was not merely indicative or marginal; on the contrary, it involved substantial financial 
assistance and guaranteed market controls. In some sectors, the existence of colonial 
markets—particularly for the sale of goods—was a distinct advantage, especially now that 
there was no advantage to be gained from the supply of colonial primary resources.14 
Following the policies established during the 1930s, agriculture in Portugal continued to 
enjoy strong state protection via the regulation of markets, price controls, and public 
investment in infrastructure. Nevertheless, this protection was not sufficient to enable the 
sector to respond to the loss of labor to industry, the service sector, and emigration. And in 
fact, it was during the 1960s, a period of strong industrialization and growth in industrial 
exports that, for the first time, Portugal’s agricultural sector experienced a population loss, 
accompanied by a sharp decline in production.15 
The Salazar government’s economic policy during these years continued to be 
marked by the development plans that came to be important references not only for the 
actions of the government itself but also for the corporative infrastructure that was being 
formed and helped banks and industrial and agricultural companies to make decisions. The 
Estado Novo revealed itself not so much through the definition of a corporatist regime but 
through the fact that it had successfully managed to have its directives followed by a large 
network of public and private institutions, with the peak of this entire organization being 
occupied by the development plans.16 Table 1 gives an idea of the importance of the 
development plans by illustrating their share of Portuguese GDP. 
 
Table 1: Economic Planning in Portugal (1935–1973) 
(total expenditure as a percentage of investment and GDP) 
 1935–1950 1953–1958 1954–1964 1965–1967 1968–1973 
% of GFCF - 14.2% 20.4% 42.9% 39.1% 
% of GDP <2% 2.4% 4.3% 9.6% 10.1% 
Source: Lains, “O Estado e a industrialização em Portugal, 1945–1990,” 928. 
 
                                                 
14 Lopes, A Economia Portuguesa desde 1960. 
15 Lains, “Catching-up to the European core. Portuguese economic growth, 1910–1990.” 
16 There were development plans for 1959–1964, an interim plan for 1965–1967, and another one for 1968–
1973. There was a fourth plan, covering the years 1974–1979, which was not implemented due to the 1974 
“revolution.” These documents, which also contained sections dealing with the colonies, are extremely useful 
for analyzing the Portuguese economy. 
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The fact that the country was enjoying a phase of greater openness to the outside 
world did not impede the continuation of its domestic interventionist policies. The 
agreement with EFTA gave the government flexibility and space for these interventions. 
Portugal’s high level of state intervention, which was not unique in continental Europe, was 
compatible with the gradual opening up of the economy to external trade: indeed, it was an 
element that facilitated the opening of the borders to foreign products. Portugal’s 
membership in EFTA represented a phase of internationalization of the Portuguese 
economy that also allowed for state intervention. For this reason, the period of EFTA 
membership can be described as a period of controlled openness, during which the state 
maintained—and even increased—its role in the management of the economy. This 
happened in Portugal just as it also happened in other European countries, whether or not 
they were members of the EEC. Portugal was therefore following policies similar to those 
pursued by most of the other Western European countries, characterized by the removal of 
trade barriers and public intervention in the economy. 
The Estado Novo’s economic policy entered a period of decline during the final 
phases of the regime, and in particular during Marcello Caetano’s consulate. This decline 
owed much to increases in the degree of political debate and to the problems the 
Portuguese economy began to face at the end of the 1960s. Even if the good rate of 
growth persisted, the increasing budgetary difficulties caused by the colonial wars, 
previously unknown increases in inflation levels, and the impact of the international 
recession came to trouble the Portuguese economy. 
It was against this background that Portugal had to face the first enlargement of the 
EEC in 1973, which incorporated the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland. The 
enlargement of the EEC undermined the role of EFTA, as the United Kingdom and 
Denmark were forced to leave this organization. At this point, it became essential for 
Lisbon to look for a solution that would enable Portugal to strengthen its trade preferences 
with the enlarged EEC. The solution was provided by the bilateral Free Trade Agreements 
(FTA) that the EEC signed with those countries that remained in EFTA. The agreement 
between the EEC and Portugal was signed in 1972 and proved to be crucial in enabling 
tariff barriers to be dismantled in the industrial sector, a process that was practically 
completed by the time Portugal eventually joined the EEC in 1986.17 In this sense, 
membership of EFTA (and then the FTA signed with the EEC) played a key role in 
dismantling trade barriers. 
                                                 
17 Sampedro and Payno, The enlargement of the European Community: case studies of Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
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III. Revolution, crisis, and recovery, 1974–1986  
 
The termination of the Bretton Woods agreement over exchange rate policy in 
1971–1973 and the hike in oil prices during the autumn of 1973 brought an end to two 
decades of international economic growth and monetary stability.18 The 1970s was a period 
of economic crisis, during which almost all countries suffered from inflation, a balance of 
payments deficit, and a sluggish rate of economic growth. In this period, the EEC tried to 
adapt to the international economic crisis and the accompanying exchange rate turbulence 
and to assimilate the first enlargement. The governments of the EEC member states 
reacted to the contraction of the international economy and the rising inflation and 
unemployment rates by introducing national economic protection measures. This 
reemergence of state protection was possible because the EEC lacked the effective powers 
to intervene in many aspects of market regulation and state subsidies. At the same time, the 
EEC members reacted to the exchange rate instability by trying to move from transatlantic 
cooperation to EEC cooperation, with the creation of the Snake agreement in 1973 and 
then with the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. Moreover, 
they made decisions that would prove to be crucial for its subsequent development, such as 
the institutionalization of the European Council in 1975, the direct election of members to 
the European Parliament in 1979, and the implementation of the EEC regional policy.19 
The development of the EEC regional policy was favorable to Portuguese 
economic policy and deserves some more attention here. The EEC Summit at The Hague 
in 1969 and the “completion, deepening, and enlargement” objectives it set (foreseeing the 
entry of new members with backward regions and the implementation of the monetary 
union) enlarged the support base for the regional policy as a way of reducing regional 
inequalities and favoring a balanced development of the Community. During the accession 
negotiations, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark supported the creation of a 
Regional Development Fund (as it came to be known) and were joined not only by the less 
developed member, Italy, but also by France and Germany, interested in implementing a 
monetary union. While there remained some disagreement over the way in which the Fund 
would be financed, even the more liberal stances accepted the principle that the 
enlargement of the Community to less developed areas and the implementation of the 
monetary union had to be accompanied by financial compensations for the weaker 
                                                 
18 James, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods. 
19 Eichengreen,  The European economy since 1945: coordinated capitalism and beyond, 225–51; Griffith (2006). 
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economies. Therefore, once again, in the economic policy of the EEC, the further opening 
up of the economies that would follow its enlargement to include new members or the 
creation of a monetary union would be accompanied by state intervention.20 
This was the EEC that in the 1980s would undergo a second enlargement, with the 
entry of Greece in 1981, followed by Portugal and Spain in 1986. The military coup of 
April 1974 and the inauguration of the democratic period with the first constitutional 
government two years later improved the possibility of Portugal becoming a member of the 
EEC. Thus, Portugal’s democratization and the transformation of the EEC as a result of its 
1973 enlargement paved the way for Portugal’s later membership. The Community was no 
longer a small group of countries with fairly similar per capita income levels, a large degree 
of interdependence, and important political affinities. This eased the enlargement while the 
internal EEC development with the implementation of a common regional policy seemed 
to further increase the advantages that Portugal could enjoy from membership. 
In 1977, Portugal’s Prime Minister, Mário Soares, called for negotiations to be 
opened with a view to Portugal’s membership. Formal negotiations began in October 1978, 
but it was not until 1980 that discussions of substantive matters finally got under way, 
coming to an end in 1984. The long road to membership resulted from the fact that the 
Portuguese economy was not in any condition to bear rapid membership and the fact that 
Portugal—and the world—had entered a recession.21 Portugal’s economic problems were 
not born with the 1974 revolution, nor were they brought about by the 1973 oil shock. 
Rather they were the result—in no particular order of significance—of the country’s 
involvement in colonial wars and the consequent difficulties of military finance, a profound 
crisis in agricultural production (with knock-on effects for the country’s trade deficit), the 
slowdown of industrial growth, the difficulties of financing the emerging social security 
system, and state-controlled price subsidies. Between October and November 1973, oil 
prices quadrupled, aggravating the inflationary tendencies that had been felt since the end 
of the 1960s. For the first time in decades, the rate of inflation in Portugal reached 20 
percent in 1974.  
As Figure 1 shows, the increase in Portugal’s degree of openness to trade was 
reversed between 1974 and 1976, both in nominal and real terms. This change is explained 
                                                 
20 Dinan, Europe Recast. A History of European Union, 149; Griffith (2006). 
21 Vallera, “The negotiation process”; Vilaça, “Portugal and European integration—negotiations and legal 
implications”; Ferreira, “A estratégia para a adesão às instituições europeias”; and Dinan, Europe Recast. A 
History of European Union, 105. The Portuguese economy experienced a period of extremely rapid growth 
between 1950 and 1973, which suggests that in that final year, the country was closer to the richest European 
countries than at any other time in its history. Lains, “Catching-up to the European core: Portuguese 
economic growth, 1910–1990.” 
Coppolaro & Lains  Portugal and European Integration 
e-JPH, Vol. 11, number 1, Summer 2013  73 
by the fact that the revolutionary period led to an increase in relative unit labor costs and, 
consequently, to a reduction in real exports, while real imports decreased as a result of the 
postponement of investment decisions. Furthermore, the decline in the degree of trade 
openness measured at current prices was also due to monetary shocks. In fact, the sharp 
increase in inflation after April 1974 was not accompanied by nominal exchange rate 
depreciations, thus leading to an increase in the GDP deflator that was higher than that of 
exports and imports. The Estado Novo’s institutional framework was rigid, and it very soon 
demonstrated its unsuitability for dealing with a situation of inflationary pressure.22 
The rigidity inherited from the Estado Novo was not challenged by the governments 
that followed the 1974 coup. The first provisional governments, not yet openly Marxist or 
collectivist, were far too weak to confront the discontent that the necessary price increases 
would bring. The populist governments that followed in 1975 were happy to retain the 
measures controlling both prices and salaries, as they formed part of the extreme left’s 
model of governance. Moreover, the governments that emerged after the coup had yet to 
come to terms with the fact that public sector wages had not been adjusted to match the 
increases in prices, and were forced to make extraordinary increases to these salaries while 
also introducing a national minimum wage. Other significant sources of disequilibrium 
resulted from the huge influx of Portuguese nationals coming to the country from the 
former African colonies and the reduction in the remittances being sent by Portuguese 
emigrants in Europe, as well as the decline in exports and capital imports. Portugal’s 
economic problems did not differ much in essence from those that affected the rest of 
Western Europe. The other countries also felt the need to make important changes to the 
structure of their economies because of the reduced external competitiveness of some 
industrial sectors, particularly the more traditional ones connected with basic industries.23 
Spain and Portugal took an important step toward their future EEC membership 
by signing a bilateral trade agreement in 1980. The trade agreements made by the two 
countries with the EEC in 1970 and 1972 respectively had effectively led to important 
reductions in customs tariffs with the European partners but had done nothing to advance 
the liberalization of trade relations between the two Iberian countries. However, the 1980 
agreement did not extend to three crucial areas, notably the reduction in trade barriers, the 
                                                 
22 Amador, Cabral, Maria, “International trade patterns over the last four decades: how does Portugal 
compare with other cohesion countries?” 4; Crespo, Fontoura, and Barry, “EU enlargement and the 
Portuguese economy.” 
23 Lains, “Catching-up to the European core: Portuguese economic growth, 1910–1990.”. 
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fisheries sector, and the reduction in agricultural tariffs. It was only with EEC membership 
that these three important areas would also be liberalized.24 
 
IV. EEC and EMU membership, 1986–1992 
 
Like the 1970s, the 1980s were also characterized by the combined effects of an 
enlargement of the Community, the deepening of existing policies, and the launch of new 
ones. These developments favored Portuguese membership. By the end of the 1970s, the 
objective of establishing a common market—set by the Treaty of Rome in 1957—had not 
been achieved. As tariff barriers were being phased out, EEC members began to erect new 
barriers among themselves, leading to a fragmentation of the common market. Because of 
this combination of a poor macroeconomic performance and the failure to achieve a real 
common market, pressures started to mount: a comprehensive and systematic response 
was required to address the problems created by the “incomplete” Europe and to resolve 
what had become known as “Eurosclerosis.” The arguments in favor of completing the 
Community market were supported by the idea that the abolition of the barriers existing to 
the free circulation of labor, capital, goods, and services, together with the reduced 
intervention of the state in the economy, would lead to productivity gains and economic 
growth.25  
It was against this background that the EEC member states took the initiative to 
stimulate economic growth by continuing to promote market integration and liberalization 
at both a regional and a multilateral level. At a multilateral level, negotiations were started 
in 1986 at the Uruguay Round of GATT with a view to enhancing the liberalization of 
international trade; at a regional level, in the same year, the EEC member states signed the 
Single European Act (SEA), which formalized the Community’s commitment to the 
implementation of a single market by December 1992 through the introduction of reforms 
leading to the free circulation of goods, capital, services, and people. At the same time, the 
EEC members were aware that, if they wished to further enhance economic growth, it was 
also necessary to enlarge the market. Thus, in the same year as the SEA was signed, 
Portugal and Spain became new members.26 
                                                 
24 Hibou, “Greece and Portugal: convergent or divergent Europeanization?” 237. 
25 Sapir et al., An Agenda for a Growing Europe: the Sapir Report. 
26 Dinan, Europe Recast: A History of European Union; Eichengreen, The European economy since 1945: coordinated 
capitalism and beyond. 
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The SEA established a direct link between the creation of a single market and the 
need to promote economic cohesion within the EEC. The first Delors package for 1988–
1992 increased the size of structural funds for investment in infrastructures and human 
capital. In this way, it linked the creation of the single market to an increase in transfers to 
poorer countries or regions, in order to help them improve their competitiveness.27 The 
enlargement that brought Greece, Spain, and Portugal into the Community was thus 
associated with the reaffirmation of the principle that richer countries should contribute 
more fully in order to compensate for the short-term negative effects of opening up the 
economies of the less developed countries, in order to allow the EEC economy to grow in 
a more balanced way.  
Thus, EEC economic policy favored Portugal at a time when the country was 
undergoing considerable political and economic transformations thanks to the convergence 
of the interests of the two main parties in the “Bloco Central” (Central Bloc) governments. 
Stabilization had been associated with changes to some of the political fundamentals 
inherited from the most intense revolutionary period. The 1982 revision of the 
Constitution abolished the Council of the Revolution, which up until then had been playing 
an increasingly less significant role in the political system. It was also necessary to revise 
that part of the Constitution stating that the 1975 nationalizations of the banking sector 
were irreversible. Domestic stabilization passed an important test with the balance of 
payments crisis provoked by the second 1979 oil shock and the European recession that 
followed. In 1979 and in 1983, the Portuguese governments signed agreements with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for loans that would allow for a restructuring of the 
foreign debt while helping to restore external equilibrium. Such loans were accompanied by 
budget cuts and tax increases, undertaken by the “Bloco Central” government led by the 
socialist Prime Minister Mário Soares.  
Negotiations over membership were therefore backed by the domestic reforms that 
Portugal had undertaken and by the EEC’s aim of deepening and enlarging its market as a 
way of promoting economic growth. However, negotiations were also eased by the fact 
that, since 1947, Portugal had already been making efforts to open up its economy to other 
Western European countries, with the result that the only country that remained highly 
protected from Portuguese exports was Spain. Moreover, the Portuguese negotiators made 
relatively few demands, and those that it did make were centered on financial 
compensation for agriculture and fisheries. The development of the Delors packages was 
                                                 
27 Beach, The Dynamics of European Integration: Why and When EU Institutions Matter, 56. 
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more of an unexpected bonus than it was the result of Portuguese pressure and concerns. 
This attitude of passivity was, in any case, rewarding, thanks to the favorable moment that 
the EEC economy was enjoying at the time of Portuguese accession.28 
Portugal’s membership of the EEC was followed by the introduction of economic 
policy measures designed to compensate for the eventual negative effects of the country’s 
fully opening up its relatively backward economy to its more developed partners. These 
measures, financed by the Community budget, were designed to stimulate public and 
private investment in priority areas, which included the restructuring of agriculture and 
investment in infrastructure and communications, as well as in the education of the 
workforce. They enabled Portuguese agriculture to adapt to external competition, furnished 
the country with a modern transport and communications infrastructure, and improved the 
skills of the country’s human resources. Moreover, they had an impact at the level of 
macroeconomic balances, since the unilateral transfer of structural funds helped to finance 
the balance of current transactions. One must, however, acknowledge that not everything 
was positive about the application of the CAP and the use of structural funds, even though 
the benefits most likely exceeded the drawbacks.29 In any case, what matters here is that 
Portuguese membership of the EEC meant the continuation of the economic policy that 
had been pursued since 1947: the opening up of the economy coupled with state 
intervention, which was now carried out with the structural funds of the EEC. As Figure 1 
shows, membership in the EEC paved the way for a second and most important wave of 
liberalization in Portuguese international trade, further increasing the openness of the 
economy. However, for Portugal, membership did not represent a turning point in its 
economic policy, but simply the continuation of an economic policy that had been 
followed since 1947. 
The integration of the European economies was given another push with the 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which established the EU and the EMU, the 1997 
Growth and Stability Pact, and the implementation of a single currency between 1999 and 
2002. Following the Spanish lead, the launch of the EMU was accompanied by an increase 
in the EU’s economic intervention capacity, made possible by the introduction of cohesion 
funds in the II Delors Package.30 The EMU resulted in a considerable increase in the 
intensity of economic relations between member states, particularly in terms of the trade 
                                                 
28 Hibou, “Greece and Portugal: convergent or divergent Europeanization?” 212–13. 
29 Allen, “Cohesion and structural funds: transfers and trade-offs,” 243–66; and Royo and Manuel, 
“Introdução.” 
30 Powell, “A adesão espanhola à União Europeia revisitada,” 200–1. 
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taking place in goods and services and capital transactions. However, the EMU was 
established during a period of deep recession and declining economic growth, particularly 
in Spain and Portugal.  
In trying to assess the Portuguese experience of European integration after its 
accession to the EEC, the implementation of the EMU and the 2004 enlargement, it 
should be noted that since 1986, there has been little development in the EU’s public 
policies. In other words, growing economic integration has been accompanied only by the 
continuation of already existing compensation policies. This is negatively reinforced by the 
fact that national governments are less able to intervene in economic matters, since they 
can no longer control their own exchange rates to effect short-term changes to 
international competition, and since they are obliged to maintain the state deficit within the 
limits imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact. 
For Portugal, membership of the EEC, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, and 
participation in adoption of the euro are all hugely important developments that make it 
possible to anticipate brighter prospects for economic development over the medium to 
long term. Portugal’s economy is small, so its development depends on ever greater 
integration into the international economy, and its adoption of the EU’s euro is the best 
guarantee of this. However, participation in an economic and monetary union with 
wealthier countries has had considerable effects on the Portuguese economy. Opening up 
the country’s trade to the outside world has led to a series of fundamental changes to the 
structure of the Portuguese economy, changes that are unequivocally linked to 
improvements in productivity, and therefore in the country’s ability to compete with the 
other EU countries. 
The international specialization of the Portuguese economy in 2005 was less 
favorable to an increase in the country’s economic growth than the situation that existed in 
1992, since those sectors with lower levels of labor and capital productivity have become 
increasingly important. These are the clear and inevitable costs associated with adapting to 
a more competitive world. In the history of the European Communities, these costs of 
growth have tended to be compensated for by policies of public support to mitigate the 
negative effects, help less developed countries to increase their competitiveness, and allow 
for a balanced growth of the EEC/EU economies. These support mechanisms have, 
however, been worth little, not only because they reached levels that were too low in the 
context of the EU budget but also because the enlargement of the EU to twenty-five 
member states in 2004 increased the number of regions and countries that were competing 
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for funds. Additionally, it is possible that the results of similar policies may be less 
impressive nowadays than they were two or three decades ago, precisely because modern 
economies are more competitive. 
As such, it is difficult to conceive of an immediate solution to the problems of 
adaptation faced by a poor country when seeking to integrate further into a community 
composed of countries that are richer and more developed in terms of industry, services, 
and market capital. It is also possible to conclude that there may be no solution, and that 
any attempts to correct the processes that are already underway will only serve to aggravate 
Portugal’s situation. The fact that there is no immediate solution does not, however, detract 
from the advantages that European integration has brought a country like Portugal.  
Nonetheless, we must take into consideration the problems that this integration has 
brought to the Portuguese economy. Furthermore, we have to be aware that the possible 
solution to the problems in the short term will inevitably be the introduction of measures 
designed to make existing norms more flexible. This was certainly what the European 
Commission was thinking when it allowed Portugal some leeway in its attempts to reduce 
the state’s budget deficit, extending the deadline until 2008. The strengthening of pan-
European projects, such as those contained in the Lisbon Strategy or those related to the 
development of communications, may also play an important role in mitigating the 
disadvantages that integration has brought to the less developed countries and regions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Economic integration has been a central feature of Western European history since 
the end of World War II. The intensity of this process has varied considerably during this 
period, depending in particular on the degree of involvement demonstrated by the different 
countries and the intensity of the areas in which the mechanisms of integration have 
occurred. The involvement of each country has depended on national political conditions 
and the actual dynamics of the integration process.  
This article has described the Portuguese path to integration by illustrating the 
economic policy of the country since the end of World War II; it has also shown how this 
policy was grounded in domestic intervention and the opening up of the economy to 
international competition, a key factor in a small country for which exports were essential. 
This policy was financed by Portugal’s joining such European institutions as the OEEC, 
the EPU and EFTA in the 1950s, and GATT at the beginning of the 1960s; its signing of 
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the FTA with the EEC in 1972; its passing of the Economic Reconstitution Law; and its 
implementation of Development Plans in the 1950s and ’60s. In this sense, Portugal 
followed the same economic policy as other Western European countries. In other words, 
a peripheral and backward country, ruled by a dictatorship, emulated the economic policy 
of the democratic, industrialized, and more developed European countries. Thus, even 
before accession, government policies in Portugal did not differ substantially from those of 
the rest of Western Europe. 
Moreover, the country’s participation in the OEEC and the EPU, its membership 
of EFTA, and then the signing of the FTA agreement with the EEC, allowed Portugal to 
progressively internationalize its economy, adapting to European competition and 
integrating with the European economy. These earlier steps in integration paved the way 
for Portugal’s accession to the EEC in 1986. As a matter of fact, when the country 
eventually joined, most of its trade had already been opened up, and membership of the 
EEC was above all crucial for ensuring greater integration with Spain. Moreover, after 
joining the Community, Portugal continued to pursue a policy based simultaneously on 
state intervention (now involving the use of the structural funds of the EEC/EU) and a 
greater openness of the economy through its participation in the Single Market Program 
and then the EMU. Thus, for Portugal, joining the EEC did not represent a breaking point, 
but simply the continuation of an economic policy that had already been pursued since 
1947.  
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